Abstract-Stochastic games are an important class of games that generalize Markov decision processes to game theoretic scenarios. We consider finite state two-player zero-sum stochastic games over an infinite time horizon with discounted rewards. The players are assumed to have infinite strategy spaces and the payoffs are assumed to be polynomials. In this paper we restrict our attention to a very special class of games for which the single-controller assumption holds. It is shown that minimax equilibria and optimal strategies for such games may be obtained via semidefinite programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Markov decision processes (MDPs) are very widely used system modeling tools where a single agent attempts to make optimal decisions at each stage of a multi-stage process so as to optimize some reward or payoff [1] . Game theory is a system modeling paradigm that allows one to model a problem where several (possibly adversarial) decision makers make individual decisions to optimize their own payoff [2] . In this paper we study stochastic games [3, 4] that allow one to combine the modeling power of MDPs and games. Stochastic games may be viewed as competitive MDPs where several decision makers make decisions at each stage to maximize their own reward. Each state of a stochastic game is a simple game, but the decisions made by the players affect not only their payoff, but also the transition to the next state.
Notions of optimality in games have been extensively studied, and are very well understood. The most popular notion of optimality is the notion of a Nash equilibrium. While these equilibria are hard to compute in general, in certain cases they may be computed efficiently. Games involving two players and finite action spaces are known to have mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Moreover, Nash equilibria for such games may be computed efficiently via linear programming. Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [4] in 1953. In his paper, he showed that the notion of a Nash equilibrium may be extended to stochastic games with finite state spaces and strategy sets. He also proposed a value iteration-like algorithm to compute the equilibria. Shapley showed that associated to this notion of equilibrium, there is a notion of value associated to the stochastic game. This value is a vector indexed by the state, and corresponds to the optimal payoff for the players given the initial state of the game. It was shown in 1981 by Parthasarathy and Raghavan [3, 5] that the value and optimal strategies for stochastic games satisfying the single controller assumption could be computed efficiently via linear programming (thus proving that such problems with rational data could be computed in a finite number of steps).
While computational techniques for finite games are reasonably well understood, there has been some recent interest in the class of infinite games [6, 7] . In this important class, players have access to an infinite number of pure strategies, and the players are allowed to randomize over these choices. In a recent paper [6] , Parrilo describes a technique to solve two player, zero-sum infinite games with polynomial payoffs via semidefinite programming. It is natural to wonder whether the techniques from finite stochastic games can be extended to infinite stochastic games (i.e. finite state stochastic games where players have access to infinitely many pure strategies). In particular, since finite, single-controller, zero-sum games can be solved via linear programming, can similar infinite stochastic games be solved via semidefinite programming? The answer is affirmative, and this paper focuses on establishing this result. The linear program that solves the finite action stochastic game satisfying (SC) (a condition defined below) can be extended to an infinite dimensional optimization problem when the actions are uncountably infinite. The main contribution of this paper is the establishment of the following properties of the infinite dimensional optimization problem: 1) Its optimal solutions correspond to minimax equilibria.
2) The problem can be solved efficiently by semidefinite programming. Section II of this paper provides a formal description of the problem and introduces the basic notation used in the paper. It also briefly describes some elegant results about polynomial nonnegativity, moment sequences of nonnegative measures, and their connection to semidefinite programming. Section III states and proves the main result of this paper. Finally, we state some natural extensions of this problem, conclusions, and directions of future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Problem formulation
We consider the problem of solving two-player zerosum stochastic games via mathematical programming. The game consists of finitely many states with two adversarial players making simultaneous decisions. Each player receives a payoff that depends on the actions of both players and the state (i.e. each state can be thought of as a particular zerosum game). The transitions between the states are random (as 
The game is completely defined via the specification of the following data:
1) The (finite) state space S = {1, . . . , S}.
2) The sets of actions for players 1 and 2 given by A 1 and A 2 .
3) The payoff function, denoted by r(s, a 1 , a 2 ), for a given set of state s and actions a 1 and a 2 (of players 1 and 2). 4) The probability transition matrix p(s ′ ; s, a 1 , a 2 ) which provides the conditional probability of transition from state s to s ′ given players' actions. 5) The discount factor β (β < 1).
Throughout this paper we make the following important assumption about the probability transition matrix:
Assumption SC
The probability transition to state s ′ conditioned upon the current state being s depends only on s, s ′ , and the action a 1 of player 1 for every s and s ′ . This probability is independent of the action of player 2. Thus, p(s ′ ; s, a 1 , a 2 ) = p(s ′ ; s, a 1 ). This is known as the single-controller assumption.
In this paper we will be concerned with the case where the action spaces of the two players A 1 and A 2 are uncountably infinite sets. For the sake of simplicity we will often consider the case where
The results easily generalize to the case where the strategy sets are finite unions of arbitrary intervals of the real line. For the sake of simplicity, we also assume that the action sets are the same for each state, though this assumption may also be relaxed. We will denote by a 1 and a 2 , the actual actions chosen by players 1 and 2 from their respective action spaces. The payoff function is assumed to be a polynomial in the variables a 1 and a 2 with real coefficients:
Finally, we assume that the transition probability p(s ′ ; s, a 1 ) is a polynomial in the action a 1 .
The decision process runs over an infinite horizon, thus it is natural to restrict one's attention to stationary strategies for each player, i.e. strategies that depend only on the state of the process and not on time. Moreover, since the process involves two adversarial decision makers, it is also natural to look for randomized strategies (or mixed strategies) rather than pure strategies so as to recover the notion of a minimax equilibrium. A mixed strategy for player 1 is a finite set of probability measures µ = [µ(1), . . . , µ(S)] supported on the action set A 1 . Each probability measure corresponds to a randomized strategy for player 1 in some particular state, for example µ(k) corresponds to the randomized strategy that player 1 would use when in state k. Similarly, player 2's strategy will be represented by ν = [ν(1), . . . , ν(N )].
(A word on notation: Throughout the paper, indices in parentheses will be used to denote the state. Bold letters will be used indicate vectorization with respect to the state, i.e. collection of objects corresponding to different states into a vector with the i th entry corresponding to state i. The Greek letters ξ, µ, ν will be used to denote measures. Subscripts on these Greek letters will be used to denote moments of the measures. For example ξ j (i) denotes the j th moment of the measure ξ corresponding to state i.)
A strategy µ leads to a probability matrix P (µ) such that P ij (µ) = A1 p(j; i, a 1 )dµ(i). Thus, once player 1 fixes a strategy µ, the probability transition matrix is fixed, and can be obtained by integrating each entry in the matrix with respect to the measure µ. (Since the entries are polynomials, upon integration, these entries depend affinely on the moments µ k (i)). Given strategies µ and ν, the reward collected by player 1 in some stage s is given by:
The reward collected over the infinite horizon (for fixed strategies µ(s) and ν(s)) starting at state s, v β (s, µ(s), ν(s)), is given by the system of equations:
The problem is to find equilibrium strategies µ 0 and ν 0 which satisfy the saddle point property:
for all mixed strategies µ, ν. (Mixed strategies that satisfy this saddle point property achieve the Nash equilibrium.) One may note that v β (µ, ν) is a vector in R S indexed by the initial state of the Markov process. Hence the above inequality is a vector inequality and is to be interpreted componentwise.
B. SDP Characterization of Nonnegativity and Moments
Let A be some interval on the real line. The set of univariate polynomials that are nonnegative on A has an exact semidefinite description. The set of (finite) vectors 46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. [12] [13] [14] 2007 WeB05.1 in R n which correspond to moment sequences of measures supported on A also has an exact semidefinite description. We briefly review these notions here and introduce some related notation [6] .
Let R[x] denote the set of univariate polynomials with real coefficients. Let
. We say that p(x) is nonnegative on A if p(x) ≥ 0 for every x ∈ A. We denote the set of nonnegative polynomials of degree n which are nonnegative on A by P(A). (To avoid cumbersome notation, we exclude the degree information in the notation. Moreover the degree will usually be clear from the context.) The polynomial p(x) is said to be a sum of squares if there exist polynomials
2 . It is well known that a univariate polynomial is a sum of squares if and only if p(x) ∈ P(R).
Let µ denote a measure supported on the set A. The i th moment of the measure µ is denoted by
We say that µ is a moment sequence of length n + 1 if it corresponds to the first n + 1 moments of some nonnegative measure µ supported on the set A. The moment space, denoted by M(A) is the subset of R n+1 which corresponds to moments of nonnegative measures supported on the set A. We say that a nonnegative measure µ is a probability measure if its zeroth order moment µ 0 = 1. The set of moment sequences of length n + 1 corresponding to probability measures is denoted by M P (A).
Let S n denote the set of n × n symmetric matrices and define the linear operator H : R 2n−1 → S n as:
Thus H is simply the linear operator that takes a vector and constructs the associated Hankel matrix which is constant along the antidiagonals. We will also frequently use the adjoint of this operator, the linear map H * : S n → R 2n−1 :
This map flattens a matrix into a vector by adding all the entries along antidiagonals. One can give a semidefinite characterization of polynomials that are nonnegative on an interval. Since in this paper we are typically considering the interval to be [0, 1] we give an explicit semidefinite characterization of P([0, 1]). We define the following matrices:
where I n×n stands for the n × n identity matrix. and W ∈ S n , Z 0, W 0 such that
Proof: See [6] . In this paper, we will also be using a very important classical result about the semidefinite representation of moment spaces [10, 11] 
Moreover, it is a moment sequence corresponding to a probability measure if and only if in addition to (1) it satisfies µ 0 = 1.
Proof: A proof may be found in [10] .
III. INFINITE STRATEGY GAMES
A. Problem Setup
In this paper we consider stochastic games in which each player can choose from uncountably many different actions. In particular, each player can choose actions from the set [0, 1]. The number of states |S| = S is assumed to be finite. The payoff function r(s, a 1 , a 2 ) is a polynomial in a 1 and a 2 for each s ∈ S. In finite action stochastic games one tries to determine probability vectors f and g (for players 1 and 2 respectively) representing probability distributions (mixed strategies) over the finite sets A 1 and A 2 (see [3] ). In this paper these are replaced by probability measures µ(s) and ν(s). These measures represent mixed strategies over the uncountable action spaces. (We remind the reader that for each player there are S measures, each measure corresponding to a mixed strategy in a particular state. For example µ(s) corresponds to the mixed strategy player 1 would adopt when the game is in state s.)
B. Preliminary Results
In this section we establish that the problems (P ′ ) and (D ′ ) (stated below) are exact duals and that they are efficiently computable via their SDP counterparts (SP ) and (SD). In subsection C we prove that the solution to the problem (P ′ ) provides the optimal cost to go and an optimal strategy for player 2 and that the optimal solution to (D ′ ) provides an optimal strategy for player 1. Consider the 46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. [12] [13] [14] 2007 WeB05.1 optimization problem:
It is infinite dimensional since it involves optimization over the space of probability measures. A feasible set of measures ν(s) correspond to a security strategy where player 2 would have to pay no more than v(s) to player 1 for a given initial state s. Note that the constraints (a) are a system of polynomial inequalities with coefficients that depend on the measure ν only via finitely many moments. More concretely, let r(s, a 1 , a 2 ) = ns,ms i,j r ij (s)a i 1 a j 2 be the payoff polynomial. Then r(s, a 1 , a 2 )dν(s) = i,j r ij (s)a i 1 ν j (s). Using this observation, this problem may be rewritten as:
, and ν 0 (s) = 1 for all s ∈ S.
Consider also the optimization problem (D ′ ) stated below. We will establish that (P ′ ) and (D ′ ) form a primal-dual pair of polynomial optimization problems.
The constraints (c) give a system of polynomial inequalities in a 1 
where R(s) is a matrix that contains the coefficients of the polynomial r(s, a 1 , a 2 ). We define a value vector for the game by
T which will turn out to be the discounted value of the stochastic game (which is dependent on the initial state). The second term in the constraint (c) which depends on the probability transition p(s ′ ; s, a 1 ) is also a polynomial in a 1 whose coefficients depend on the coefficients of p(s ′
for some matrix Q(s) which contains the coefficients of p(s ′ ; s, a 1 ).
Let E s ∈ R ds×S be the matrix which has a 1 in the (1, s) position. Then the semidefinite program (SP ) given by: The dual of (SP ) is given by the following semidefinite program:
Lemma 4: The dual SDP (SD) is equivalent to the polynomial optimization problem (D ′ ): Proof: This again follows as a consequence of lemmas 1 and 2. Remarks 1. Note that in the dual problem, the moment sequences do not necessarily correspond to probability measures. Hence, to convert them to probability measures, one 46th IEEE CDC, New Orleans, USA, Dec. [12] [13] [14] 2007 WeB05.1 needs to normalize the measure. Upon normalization, one obtains the optimal strategy for player 1.
2. The solution of the SDPs give moment sequences corresponding to the optimal measures. The optimal measures themselves can be chosen to be atomic and may be recovered by standard techniques that rely only on linear algebra (see [10] , [6] ).
Lemma 5:
The polynomial optimization problems (P ′ ) and (D ′ ) are strong duals of each other. Proof: We prove this by showing that the semidefinite program (SP ) satisfies Slater's constraint qualification and that it is bounded from below. The result then follows from the strong duality of the equivalent semidefinite programs (SP ) and (SD). First pick µ(s) and ν(s) to be the uniform distribution on [0, 1] for each state s ∈ S. One can show [10] that the moment sequence of µ is in the interior of the moment space of [0, 1]. As a consequence, constraints (i) and (j) are strictly positive definite. Using the strategies µ and ν, evaluate the discounted value of this pair of strategies as:
Choose v > v β . The polynomial inequalities given by (c) are all strictly positive and thus constraints (l) are strictly positive definite. The equality constraints are trivially satisfied.
To prove that the problem is bounded below, we note that r(s, a 1 , a 2 ) is a polynomial and that the strategy spaces for both players are bounded. Hence,
r(s, a 1 , a 2 )
is finite and provides a trivial lower bound for v(s). Lemma 6: Letν * (s) andξ * (s) be optimal moment sequences for (P ′ ) and (D ′ ) respectively. Let ν * (s) and ξ * (s) be the corresponding measures supported on A 1 and A 2 respectively. The following complementary slackness results hold for the optima of (P ′ ) and (D ′ ):
(3) Proof: The result follows from the strong duality of the equivalent semidefinite representations of the primal-dual pair (P ′ ) − (D ′ ). The Lagrangian function for (P ′ ) is given by: 
C. Main Theorem
Let p * be the optimal value of (P ′ ), and d * be the optimal value of (D ′ ). Let ν * (s) and ξ * (s) be the optimal measures recovered in (P ′ ) and (D ′ ). Let
so that µ * is a normalized version of ξ * (i.e. µ * is a probability measure). Let v * be the the vector of value functions obtained via the optimal solution of (P ′ ). Theorem 1: The optimal solutions to the primal-dual pair (P ′ ), (D ′ ) satisfy the following:
satisfies the saddle-point inequality:
for all mixed strategies µ, ν. Proof: 1) Follows from the strong duality of the primal-dual pair
Upon simplification and vectorization of v
Using a Bellman equation argument or by simply iterating this equation (i.e. substituting repeatedly for v * ) it is easy to see that v * = v β (µ * , ν * ). 3) Consider inequality (c) it at its optimal value. We have for every state s:
Integrating with respect to some arbitrary probability measure µ(s) (with support on A 1 ), we get:
Thus,
Iterating this equation, we obtain v β (µ * , ν * ) = v * ≥ v β (µ, ν * ) for every strategy µ. This completes one side of the saddle point inequality.
Using the normalized version of equation (4), we get: respect to any arbitrary probability measure ν(s) with support on A 2 we obtain α * (s) ξ * 0 (s) ≤ r(s, µ * (s), ν(s)).
Thus r(s, µ * (s), ν * (s)) ≤ r(s, µ * (s), ν(s)) for every s. Multiplying throughout by (I − βP (µ * )) −1 , we get v β (µ * , ν * ) ≤ v β (µ * , ν). This completes the other side of the saddle point inequality.
IV. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have presented a technique for solving two-player, zero-sum finite state stochastic games with infinite strategies and polynomial payoffs when the singlecontroller assumption holds. We show that the problem can be reduced to solving a system of univariate polynomial inequalities and moment constraints. We use techniques from the classical theory of moments and sum-of-squares to reduce the problem to a semidefinite programming problem. By solving a primal-dual pair of semidefinite programs, we obtain minimax equilibria and optimal strategies for the players.
It is known that finite-state, finite action, two-player zerosum games which satisfy the orderfield property [12] may be solved via linear programming. The single-controller case, games with perfect information, switching controller stochastic games, separable reward-state independent transition (SER-SIT) games and additive games satisfy this property. We intend to extend these cases to the infinite strategy case with polynomial payoffs. General finite action stochastic games which do not satisfy the orderfield property are still amenable to computation via value iteration type techniques from dynamic programming. We plan to extend these results to the polynomial case as well.
